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In the last twenty years, a large amount of literature emerged on whether
and how sterilized foreign exchange intervention can affect the exchange
rate. However, the whole debate still lacks clear and unambiguous conclu-
sions. As a result, without having sound arguments for or against its use,
monetary authorities often decide about official intervention in the foreign
exchange market according to some kind of “flair”.
The recent strong appreciation of the Czech koruna and foreign ex-
change interventions conducted by the Czech central bank in 2001–2002
provide an opportunity to summarize existing arguments and assess this
controversial monetary policy instrument in the light of the current theo-
retical debate and the empirical evidence on foreign exchange interven-
tion.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, the “appreciation episode”
of the Czech koruna is described. Section 3 is devoted to the theoretical de-
bate on foreign exchange intervention, discussing motives and channels
through which intervention can influence exchange rates. Section 4 shortly
surveys the literature about empirical evidence on foreign exchange inter-
vention and section 5 concludes by reinterpreting the Czech experience in
the light of the current debate.
2. The “Appreciation Episode” of the Czech Koruna
During the last quarter of the year 2001 and in 2002, the central bank of
the Czech Republic (the Czech National Bank, CNB) intervened several
times in the foreign exchange market to reduce the value of the Czech ko-
runa that began to appreciate sharply in September 2001 against the euro
in nominal as well as in real terms. Since 1999, the appreciation trend at
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the view of any of the above institutions. (gersl@mbox.fsv.cuni.cz)about 4 % annually in nominal terms was an obvious fact that could have
been easily explained by means of the textbook theories on the basis of eco-
nomic fundamentals (including the Balassa-Samuelson effect). The trend
was generally accepted by most economists as well as by the central bank
and government officials. However, between September 2001 and July 2002
the koruna strongly appreciated another 15 % against the euro nominally,
representing considerable risks for the export-oriented Czech economy.
Central bank economists and other economic experts considered this ac-
celeration as being driven mainly by market expectations of significant in-
crease in privatization revenues in euro in the Czech Republic and their
conversion into the domestic currency on the foreign exchange market, i.e.
by a temporary one-off event and not by economic fundamentals or interest
rate differentials. In the media, the CNB representatives called the upward
path of thekoruna anirrational “speculative bubble” that must burst sooner
or later. As the koruna was appreciating, export-oriented firms that had not
hedged their euro revenues were suffering huge losses and the pressure on
the central bank and government to stop the appreciation increased. Ac-
cording to the official central bank statement, a strong koruna and the co-
incident downturn of economic growth in the EU in that period could “harm
the competitiveness of Czech exports, significantly decrease economic
growth in the Czech Republic and cause the GDP to depart from its ba-
lanced level again. The present combination of factors also presents a risk
for the current account, i.e. for the external balance of the Czech economy.
Sooner or later the exchange rate would have to weaken back to its funda-
mentally justified value, but the aforementioned exchange rate fluctuations
would have negative consequences for the economy.” (Czech National Bank,
2002).
Under the term “negative consequences” we have to understand not only
a temporary decrease in economic growth or even an economic decline, but
as well a risk of higher inflation volatility and the resulting multiple miss
of the inflation target, set by the central bank as a primary monetary po-
licy objective in the inflation targeting regime. As stated by Wadhwani
(2000), without any policy measures taken against it, an overvaluation of
thedomestic currency in terms of deviation from theequilibrium trend could
have a strong “hysteresis” effect. An overvalued currency will cause a num-
ber of firms to go out of the business because of losses from export revenues
or lower domestic sales due to cheaper imported goods. A decline in eco-
nomic activity results in higher unemployment and a lower rate of inflation
that can be deeply under the target or target band. At some uncertain date
in the future when the exchange rate comes back to the fundamentally jus-
tified level the economy will go upwards with the risk of inflationary over-
shoot in this recovery phase.
The resulting volatility in the inflation rate could be very damaging to
the credibility of the central bank as well, raising further inflation risks
through the channel of inflation expectations. For all the above-mentioned
reasons a consensus between the central bank representatives and the go-
vernment was reached about the necessity to weaken the koruna back to
the more fundamental value. The government was interested in the wea-
kening not only because of a threat of an economic decline and a rise in un-
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pected privatization revenues when converted from the euro into the very
strong koruna. 
The effort to reduce the value of the koruna does not have to be a devia-
tion from the monetary policy’s primary goal. In the inflation-targeting
regime, the primary aim of the monetary authority is to hit the inflation
target expressed in terms of a point or a band. Such a single objective of
the monetary policy does not mean that the central bank does not pay at-
tention to the other macroeconomic variables like the GDP, the exchange
rate or unemployment. On the contrary, because of interdependencies in
economy and different transmission channels through which the monetary
policy operates, such aggregates are very important to consider, when main-
taining the price stability. Thus, although it may look like trying to prevent
an economic decline by helping the exporters to restore their revenues, mea-
sures taken against further appreciation of the koruna with the aim to re-
duce the hysteresis effect are consistent with maintaining price stability as
the primary goal of the monetary policy.
The consensus reached between the central bank and government about
weakening the domestic currency does not have to mean giving up the in-
dependence of the central bank either. The nature of the appreciation based
mainly on expectations of government behavior prevents the central bank
from using the standard monetary policy instrument – the interest rates –
to combat excessive appreciation. Additional tools are required that can di-
rectly alter the expectations of traders in the foreign exchange market.
The Strategy for Dealing with the Exchange Rate Effects of Capital Inflows
from Privatization of State Property and from Other Foreign Exchange Re-
venues of the State (the Strategy, hereafter), proposed by the central bank,
approved and really followed by the government, represents not only such
a tool but as well a kind of contract between two equally independent bo-
dies. Such an act is then to be interpreted as the actual exercise of the cen-
tral banks’ independence rather than its failure.
The “action plan” against excessive appreciation, of course never called
such a way and considered ex post rather than ex ante, consisted of three
elements: the Strategy, the decline in central bank’s interest rates and the
foreign exchange intervention ((Holub, (2003, p. 17) identifies these three
“policy measures” as well)). In the Strategy, the government promised not
to convert the current and future privatization proceeds into the koruna in
the foreign exchange market but to sell them directly into the CNB’s fo-
reign exchange reserves.1 As we can see from Figure 1, the approval of
the Strategy by the government did not have a substantial effect on the ex-
change rate trend. One of the reasons could be that the market did not be-
lieve that the government would meet its obligations stated in the Strategy.
However, the government surprisingly followed the Strategy in May 2002,
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1 The Strategy comprises more arrangements and provisions that the government should
meet, all of them relating to the foreign exchange revenues. For example, there is an obli-
gation of the government not to issue bonds denominated in foreign currencies – see (CNB,
2002). Some kind of agreement between central bank and government about neutralizing for-
eign exchange revenues of the state existed and was followed already before the new Strat-
egy was approved.when therevenues from thefirst privatization deal thereafter2of an amount
of more than four billions euro were purchased by the CNB directly into its
foreign exchange reserves. But the market expectations as the main cause
for koruna appreciation was altered much more by the announcement of
the cancellation some big privatization deals in October and November 2002
that were previously regarded as a certainty (with expected revenues of
more than two billions euros).
The second instrument in the fight against the strong koruna was a de-
cline in the interest rates, which were reduced five times in a period of nine
months. The key central bank’s interest rate – the two-week repo rate – was
cut from 5.25 % in November 2001 to 3 % at the end of July 2002.3 The rea-
sons for the decline in interest rates were of course presented in a way usual
for the inflation targeting communication: the rapid koruna appreciation
creates a sudden tightening of monetary conditions that, according to
the new inflation forecast, situates the annual inflation below the targeted
band, thus providing reasons for cutting interest rates. Beyond these words,
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FIGURE 1 The CZK/EUR Exchange Rate, Foreign Exchange Interventions, 2W Repo Rates
and Strategy in the “Czech Koruna Episode”
Source: Czech National Bank (www.cnb.cz); Czech economic press, especially
2 Transgas, a. s., an European natural gas transporter and importer of natural gas to the Czech
Republic, was sold to the German company RWE Gas AG.
3 Since July 2002, the interest rates were further lowered, standing at 2 % since August 2003.
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[CZK/EUR] [%]we have to understand that the export firms, their sub-suppliers and pro-
ducers for the domestic market affected with a sudden decline in their com-
petitiveness are put under pressure to quickly increase their productivity
or to lower costs. Because of the relative downward rigidity of wages and
other inputs (loans with fixed interest, for example), the central bank faces
the following choices: to either let the firms go out of business, which could
have strong effects on the macroeconomic stability of the very open Czech
economy, or to help them alittle by cutting interest rates and reduce thebur-
den that they bear.
The third instrument used by the central bank, which is much more am-
biguous and without clear empirical evidence, was the foreign exchange in-
tervention. There were two phases of interventions. In the first phase, start-
ing in October 2001 and ending in April 2002, the central bank intervened
four times in the foreign exchange market (see Figure 1) in a very similar
way. After an ordinary or extraordinary meeting, the Bank Board announced
to the press not only its decision to intervene, but as well the fact that – at
the time of announcement – it was already intervening. However, this kind
of intervention had only a very small and temporary impact on the exchange
rate (see again Figure 1), thus a change of intervention strategy came. In
the second phase of interventions, beginning in July 2002 and ending in
September 2002, the central bank intervened secretly, without any an-
nouncement to the public. Some of the interventions were immediately 
confirmed by dealers in the foreign exchange market (when the central 
bank bought the euro itself) or subsequently revealed by publishing the Bank
Board meeting minutes, which are regularly put on the central bank’s web
site with a lag of 12 days (when the central bank intervened through some
foreign banks). During both phases, a number of verbal interventions made
by the Bank Board members accompanied the official interventions.
The effect of the secret interventions on reversing the exchange rate de-
velopment was not small, mainly because the central bank managed to keep
the traders in uncertainty about future interventions and exchange rate de-
velopment. On the other hand, it is not easy to confirm empirically that
the desired depreciation of the koruna, starting in August 2002, was due to
the interventions. The expectations of traders were further influenced by
other factors like the process of government building in July 2002, an-
nounced changes in government economic policy, resulting in canceling some
privatizations later in October and November 2002, as well as by the ex-
pected economic effects of the flood that surprised the Czech Republic in
August 2002.
Looking at the exchange rate development in Figure 1, we can see the “ap-
preciation bubble” at the time axis somewhere between November 2001 and
December 2002. We could imagine a stable koruna appreciation of 4 % an-
nually in this “bubble” period as well, resulting in the same exchange rate
values in the first months of 2003. Thus, one can argue that the central
bank succeeded not only in reversing the very sharp appreciation, but as
well in “putting” the contemporary exchange rates on the “right” values, i.e.
consistent, according to the central bank’s opinions, with economic funda-
mentals.
The question that remains is that of the role of the foreign exchange in-
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ing make use of foreign exchange intervention when facing sharp and un-
desirable changes in the exchange rate of the domestic currency? If the “ac-
tion plan” of the Czech National Bank had failed, the answer would have
been obviously no. However, the plan succeeded, providing further argu-
ments to the contemporary theoretical debate about the efficiency and de-
sirability of foreign exchange intervention, even if the size of the interven-
tion effect, in comparison with other factors contributing to the reversion
of the koruna appreciation, is unknown. The debate is described in the next
section.
3. The Debate about Foreign Exchange Intervention4
The debate about efficiency and desirability of foreign exchange inter-
vention started predominantly with the break-up of the Bretton Woods Sys-
tem in 1971 when the participating countries decided to abandon fixed ex-
change rates and moved one after the other to managed floating. Of course,
foreign exchange intervention as a central bank’s tool had already been
practiced before.5 However, in the era of gold standard, gold exchange stan-
dard or in the Bretton Woods System, i.e. in regimes with adherence to some
kind of fixed exchange rate, intervention was not viewed as a discretional
policy instrument available in policy tool kits of monetary authorities. It
was rather a passive act of buying or selling foreign currency used to help
maintain the exchange rate within prescribed margins and as such, it was
largely practiced in the Bretton Woods era (Dominguez – Frankel, 1993a),
(Edison, 1993), (Lehment, 1980).
With the introduction of floating exchange rates in 1971–1973, the scale
of intervention even increased (Edison, 1993), (Bopp, 1982), (Lehment,
1980). Because in the floating-rate regime the central bank is not obliged
to purchase or sell foreign currency to maintain some level of exchange rate,
one has to ask why central banks intervened at all.
3.1 Motives for Intervention
Edison (1993) in his often-cited study lists four possible motives given
by monetary authorities for intervening in the floating-rate regime: (1) to
calm disorderly markets, (2) to influence exchange rate movements, (3) to
target exchange rates, or simply (4) to support other central banks’ ex-
change-rate operations (for example, to help settle large transactions). Re-
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4 Frait (1997) already introduced the theoretical debate on foreign exchange intervention to
the Czech economic audience. In this paper, however, the section brings additionally some new
arguments relating intervention and the inflation-targeting regime, discusses some new chan-
nels of influence, and covers new literature since 1997 as well.
5 In the case of the Czech Republic, for example, the predecessor of the National Bank of
Czechoslovakia and first monetary authority in the Czechoslovakia in the period 1919–1926 –
the Banking Department of Ministry of Finance – made a large use of foreign exchange inter-
vention with the aim to strengthen the new currency (Czechoslovak koruna). The monetary
regime of that period was a kind of managed floating with heavy exchange restrictions on cur-
rent and capital account transactions.garding the first goal, there is a long-lasting consensus that disorderly fo-
reign exchange market conditions (low liquidity, high bid-ask spreads or
even missing transaction counterparties, for example no buyers of some
currency) can justify the using of intervention (Jurgensen, 1983), (Em-
minger, 1986, p. 307). However, the definition of “disorderly” is naturally
ambiguous: some countries intervened almost daily in order to prevent
even an emergence of “disorderly conditions”, other countries waited till
some “crisis” or a large liquidity shortage in the foreign exchange market
actually had appeared.
Most of the studies on foreign exchange intervention emphasize the se-
cond motive, i.e. influencing the exchange rate development (Jurgensen,
1983), (Edison, 1993). Neely (2001) discusses empirical evidence from a sur-
vey of foreign exchange practices: 89.5 % of 22 surveyed authorities inter-
vened sometimes or always to resist short-run volatility in exchange rates
and 66.7 % of the authorities used intervention to correct medium-term
“misalignments” of exchange rates away from “fundamental” values. Bail-
lie and Osterberg (1997) cite some other studies and public statements in
which central banks stand ready to influence the level of an exchange rate
and/or to reduce its volatility.
Dominguez and Frankel (1993a) ask more generally whether monetary
authorities need an independent policy tool for influencing exchange rates
at all, thus restating the problem in terms of the classic debate over costs
and benefits of two polar cases, fixed rates and floating rates.6 If a country
chooses the floating, why should its monetary authority further aim to af-
fect the exchange rate development?
There are two answers usually held by advocates of intervention. In
the short run, floating exchange rates tend to be volatile and create uncer-
tainty about their future development, thus discouraging international eco-
nomic activities. Stabilization of exchange rates via daily interventions, for
example by “leaning-against-the-wind” strategy, i.e. attempting to move
an exchange rate in the opposite direction from its current trend, can help
promote exports, imports and international lending. Short-run fluctuations
of exchange rates were often included in the disorderly market conditions
by policy makers (Jurgensen, 1983), (Emminger, 1986).
In the medium-term, imperfections in the foreign exchange market can
prevent the exchange rate from playing its appropriate role as a signal.
Some practitioners (Emminger, 1986, p. 325), (Jurgensen, 1983) as well as
some theoreticians (Dominguez – Frankel, 1993a, p. 38) in the field often
argue that foreign exchange markets are far from being efficient. Band-
wagon effects, herding behavior and self-fulfilling expectations may cause
speculative bubbles and large exchange rate misalignment from funda-
mental values. This creates a false signal for economic subjects and may
lead to misallocation of resources that can turn into large real costs after
the speculative bubble bursts. Thus, interventions aiming to bring the ex-
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6 For a discussion of cost and benefits of fixed-rate versus floating-rate regime see (Krugman –
Obstfeld, 2000, pp. 569–577), (Husted – Melvin, 2001, pp. 483–485) or (Lawler – Seddighi, 2001,
pp. 247–249).change rate back to a fundamental value decrease possible real costs of mis-
alignment and raise market efficiency.
Targeting some exchange rate level or trend seems like compromising
fixed and floating rates: the exchange rate is floating, thus allowing mar-
ket forces to do their work, i.e. create signals, accommodate external shocks
and prevent sudden balance of payment crises, but at the same time mo-
netary authorities stand ready to defend a particular exchange rate level,
thus lowering uncertainty about exchange rate development. However,
there are at least three problems associated with such an exchange rate
policy. 
First, if monetary authority targets an exchange rate that is not based on
economic fundamentals, including monetary conditions, a conflict may soon
arise between external and internal economic policy goals. 
Second, even if the central bank tries to target a fundamental-based
level there is the problem of how to find this level. Third, targeting some
exchange rate level can bring economic subjects into the moral hazard
situation: firms involved in international transactions may give up pro-
tecting themselves against exchange risk by hedging on the forward mar-
kets, relying on the ability of the central bank to defend the announced
level. When the central bank fails to defend a particular exchange rate
level by means of intervention, firms suffer huge losses as in the case of
financial crises in the fixed-rate regime. As a result, countries adopt this
strategy often as a temporary stage between fixed-rate and floating-rate
regime.7
Another approach to the motives for intervening, highly relevant for
the Czech case, emerged in the last years with the inflation-targeting
framework.8 Because the main goal of monetary policy is price stability,
defined in terms of moderate annual inflation and interpreted often in
terms of small volatility around the inflation target (Wadhwani, 2000), any
measure that helps reach the goal without having undesirable side effects
is allowed (see as well the discussion of the “hysteresis” hypothesis men-
tioned above). Heikensten and Borg (2002, pp. 31–32) from the inflation
targeting central bank of Sweden (Riksbank) justify using intervention in
the inflation targeting regime to influence the exchange rate “as a means
of contributing to a future development of the exchange rate that aided
the inflation rate to develop in line with the Riksbank’s target”. Interven-
tion as a monetary policy tool can be further used in those cases when
the traditional interest rate instrument no longer functions effectively. For
example, if the nominal interest rate is close to zero, or if the effect of in-
terest rate change is considered to be small, or if it can help support the ge-
neral objectives of economic policy (for example GDP growth and low un-
employment), without neglecting the inflation target, the intervention is
allowed.
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7 The “crawling-peg” regime adopted by some post-socialist countries like Hungary or by Israel
is a good example of such policy – see (Krugman – Obstfeld, 2000, p. 486), for the case of Israel
see (Klein, 2001) or the web-site of the Bank of Israel (http://www.bankisrael.gov.il/).
8 For the discussion of inflation targeting regime see (Bernanke et al., 1999), (Mishkin –
Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001), (Svensson, 1999), or from the monetary rules point of view (McCallum,
1997).3.2 How Can Intervention Work in Theory?
Foreign exchange market intervention is usually defined as “those foreign
exchange transactions of monetary authorities designed to influence ex-
change rates” (Neely, 2001), (Sarno – Taylor, 2001).9 The central bank thus
sells the domestic currency (or domestic assets) for a foreign currency (or
foreign assets) if it wants to decrease the value of domestic currency and,
likewise, sells foreign assets for domestic assets when aiming to increase
the value of domestic currency. Such transactions can influence exchange
rates through several channels.
Before we discuss the channels in detail, it is necessary to distinguish
between sterilized intervention, which does not affect the money supply,
and nonsterilized intervention, which does. According to Sarno and Taylor
(2001), official intervention is said to be sterilized when the authorities
take action to offset the effects of a change in official foreign asset hold-
ings on the domestic monetary base. For example, when the central bank
sells foreign currency for domestic currency, it decreases monetary base
and money supply. In order to sterilize this side effect the central bank
must provide – simultaneously or within a very short space of time – money
of the same size via traditional open market operations (i.e. by providing
money against domestic assets as collateral). If it does not do that, the in-
tervention remains nonsterilized and is simply another way of conducting
monetary policy, the only difference being that the monetary base is al-
tered through a change in foreign, rather than domestic, asset holdings.
As Edison (1993, p. 10) summarizes, “sterilized intervention is a ‘pure’
change in the relative stocks of domestic and foreign assets held by the pub-
lic [...] It changes only the currency composition of the assets held by
the public by changing the composition of the monetary authorities’ port-
folio.” As such, sterilized intervention constitutes an independent policy
tool.
3.2.1 The “Market” Channel
The simplest channel, surprisingly not discussed in the literature per-
haps because of its obvious simplicity, is based on the theoretical function-
ing of foreign exchange markets (hence, I call it the market channel). Acen-
tral bank that is acting in the foreign exchange market alters the demand
or supply of foreign currency and thus the actual price (i.e. the exchange
rate) as well. More technically, if the daily official exchange rate is for exam-
ple computed as the average of all trades that took place that day, then 
every transaction executed by the central bank and its counterparties at
exchange rates different from prevailing one will influence the official rate.
How it is possible for the central bank to trade at exchange rates different
from the prevailing rate? Because the central bank’s motive is not to make
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9 Central banks usually define official foreign exchange intervention more broadly as “any offi-
cial sale or purchase of foreign assets against domestic assets” (Dominguez – Frankel, 1993a,
p. 55). However, this definition also includes operations intended to influence the country’s stock
of foreign exchange reserves.profit but to influence exchange rate it does not have to care so much about
the profitability of its transactions and can thus “lean against the wind”.10
By offering to buy foreign currency at a price that is higher than the mar-
ket price (or higher than the lowest market offer to sell foreign currency),
the central bank that is aiming to decrease the value of domestic currency
immediately executes the trade and moves the daily average exchange rate
upwards.
What is wrong with this simple channel? First, the described mechanism
may work this way in theory, but in reality, the contacted subject (com-
mercial bank or another market maker) usually offers the price of the con-
tract.11 However, the contacted commercial bank knows that the central
bank is intervening in order to influence the exchange rate and not to make
profits, so that a price offer advantageous for the commercial bank and dis-
advantageous for the central bank will be accepted.
Second, the monetary authority would have to trade an enormous vo-
lume of currency if it wanted to alter the (daily average) exchange rate 
or even to reverse an exchange rate trend. The volumes traded in fo-
reign exchange markets rose considerably in last 20 years: the average
daily foreign exchange market turnover worldwide in April 2001 was
USD1,210billion, which is very large compared to the usual central bank’s
foreign exchange reserves (Galati – Melick, 2002, p. 2). In the U.S. mar-
ket, the volume of trading averaged around USD 100 billion a day in 1989
(and rose to USD 192 billion only three years later), whereas the average
size of U.S. operations in the 1980s was about USD 200 million a day, i.e.
0.2% of daily turnover (Dominguez – Frankel, 1993a, p.89), (Edison, 1993,
p. 11). One can hardly imagine that such intervention can have any ef-
fects.
The third argument against the market channel challenges the sustain-
ability of the intervention effect: even if the central bank managed to move
the official exchange rate in the desired direction via intervention, the ef-
fect must be inevitably short-run. If market expectations do not change “in
the desired direction”, the central bank would have to intervene daily in or-
der to offset the market demand. Such behavior could furthermore create
risk-free profit opportunities for speculators, thus raising the volume of in-
tervention needed to maintain the desired level of exchange rate.
On the other hand, under the following assumptions the market channel
can work quite well. First, if the foreign exchange market is “thin” and li-
quidity is low, the intervention can have at least a short-term considerable
effect (a possible long-term effect is discussed later in the part devoted to
the noise trading channel). This seems to be also the case of the Czech ko-
runa episode: the average volume of spot trading in the foreign exchange
market in April 2002 was about USD 700 million a day (and only
USD 375 million of CZK-EUR trading), whereas the average size of inter-
vention could have been about USD 300 million a day. Moreover, the cen-
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10 Profitability, although not being the motive for intervention at all – see (Neely, 2001) – is of
course of relevance for the central bank – see for example (Edison, 1993, pp. 42–46).
11 I owe this comment to one anonymous referee.tral bank intervened often on Fridays when the market liquidity was sup-
posed to be low.12
Second, if the central bank is not bound by the volume of its foreign ex-
change reserves (i.e. it is buying foreign currency in order to decrease
the value of domestic currency), it can theoretically intervene without limit,
as opposed to the fight against a depreciation. The only condition is that
the costs of sterilization must be sufficiently low or even negative, for exam-
ple through the negative interest rate differential (higher interest rate on
the acquired foreign exchange reserves than on the domestic currency that
is bought by the central bank when sterilizing), so that the central bank
does not accumulate losses.
3.2.2 The Monetary Channel
The monetary channel, discussed for example by (Galati – Melick, 2002),
works only if the intervention is not (or not to the full extent) sterilized. In
this case, intervention influences domestic monetary base, money supply in
the money market and thus short-term interest rates. The interest rate
change affects through the uncovered interest rate parity the demand for do-
mestic assets and the exchange rate, as described in traditional monetary
models of exchange rate determination.13Suppose that thecentral bank wants
to depreciate the domestic currency and purchases foreign currency, without
offsetting the effect of the resulting higher money supply. Short-term inte-
rest rates in money market decline, investors sell domestic assets for (now
more profitable) foreign assets and the domestic currency depreciates.
There is a strong consensus that nonsterilized intervention can influence
exchange rates similarly to monetary policy via affecting money supply, in-
terest rates and market expectation (Sarno – Taylor, 2001), (Edison, 1993).
On theother hand, continuing discussion about theprecise effects of changes
in monetary base on interest rates (for example, in the presence of stand-
ing facilities preventing the market interest rates from deviating too much
from the central bank’s main policy rate) and that of interest rates changes
on exchange rates (Bilson – Marston, 1984), (Taylor, 1995) signals some fur-
ther research into the functioning of this channel – see for example (Borio,
1997).
3.2.3 The Portfolio Balance Channel
Most of the literature emphasizes only two channels through which 
intervention can affect the exchange rate: the portfolio balance channel and
the signaling (or expectations) channel (Edison, 1993). The effects of in-
tervention through the portfolio balance channel are analyzed within
the framework of a portfolio balance model of exchange rate determination,
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12 The data and estimates are available on the official web site of Czech National Bank
(www.cnb.cz) or in Czech economic press (for example www.ihned.cz).
13 For a survey and discussion of monetary models of exchange rate determination, see for exam-
ple (Bilson – Marston, 1984).a dynamic model based on the interactions of international asset markets
and current account imbalances.14 The key assumption that distinguishes
this kind of model from monetary models of exchange rate determination
is the imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign assets. In-
vestors diversify their holdings among domestic and foreign assets as func-
tions of expected rates of return.
Taylor (1995) or Edison (1993) set out a very basic portfolio balance model
that, slightly modified here, can be used to explain how the channel works:
net financial wealth (in domestic currency) of the domestic private sector
(W) is divided into three components: money (M), domestic bonds (B) and
foreign bonds (B*). With foreign and domestic interest rates given by i and
i*, we can calculate simple domestic demand functions and definition of
the net wealth as follows:
MD = M (i,i* + S
^e, W), Mi < 0, Mi*+ S
^e < 0, MW = 0 (1)
BD = B (i,i* + S
^e, W), Bi > 0, Bi*+ S
^e < 0, BW > 0 (2)
1
B*D = –– B* (i,i* + S
^e, W), B*
i < 0, Bi*+ S
^e > 0, B*
W > 0 (3)
S
W   M + B + SB* (4)
where S denotes the spot exchange rate (domestic currency for unit of fo-
reign currency), S
^e denotes the expected rate of depreciation of the domes-
tic currency, and Xk denotes the partial derivative of X(.) with respect to 
k for X = M, B and B*. Assume that the supplies of money (MS), domestic
bonds (BS) and foreign bonds (B*S) are predetermined and that the domes-
tic economy is in equilibrium (i.e. supply equals demand for money and both
kinds of bonds). Now, if the monetary authority wants to depreciate the do-
mestic currency by sterilized intervention, it purchases foreign bonds from
private investors and sell them domestic bonds. However, because the eco-
nomy was already in equilibrium, the private investors will require a higher
expected return on domestic assets relative to foreign assets to willingly
hold the increased supply of domestic bonds and lower their holdings of fo-
reign bonds. If interest rates, due to their determination in money market
and sterilization operations, do not change, then the exchange rate must
change, i.e. in our case depreciate, in order to restore equilibrium. Depre-
ciation, in terms of a rise in S, results in a rise in W (equation (4)), which
increases the demand for domestic assets, and cuts the demand for foreign
assets according to equations (3) and (4).15
The portfolio balance channel is much more controversial than the mo-
netary channel. First, according to the standard literature, there is a pro-
blem of testing the theory (Edison, 1993), (Dominguez – Frankel, 1993b).
All tests, usually estimating the risk premium gained from inverted asset
demand functions as a function of asset supplies, are necessarily tests of
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Marston, 1984) or (Taylor, 1995).the joint hypothesis on the degree of asset substitutability and on the ex-
pectation formation.
Second, a theoretical discussion about the model’s assumptions has
emerged. If, for example, the Ricardian equivalence holds, i.e. the govern-
ment bonds entail a public liability of future taxation, investors will not
consider bonds as “true” assets forming their wealth, thus swaps in cur-
rency composition of investors’ portfolios will have no effect on the foreign
exchange market equilibrium. Another argument against this channel is
that domestic bonds and foreign bonds are perfect substitutes, so that
changes in their relative supply may have no effects (Dominguez – Frankel,
1993b), (Sarno – Taylor, 2001).
Third, the whole theory does not explain the mechanism of how the ex-
change rate changes. The standard macroeconomic explanation, that theex-
change rate must have changed because it was necessary to restore equi-
librium, lack not only microeconomic or structural foundations, but could
be simply wrong. Even if the monetary authority, in our case, managed to
purchase from the investors the foreign assets for the domestic assets,
the only way in which it can do that is to accept a price (exchange rate) that
is profitable for the contacted counterparty. This is nothing else but our sim-
ple market channel with all its problems, the one of negligible volume of in-
tervention as compared to the market turnover being perhaps the most re-
levant here. As Henderson (1984, p. 391) writes, “the argument that inter-
vention policy may not alter the exchange rate when securities are imper-
fect substitutes represents a more fundamental challenge to [the] theory
[...] When the intervention, changing the holdings of private investors, i.e.
thecomposition of their portfolios, does not affect expectation, private agents
simply alter their direct holdings in an offsetting way, leaving the exchange
rate unchanged.”
Because of ambiguous test results and the theoretical critique just 
described, a consensus slowly emerges that the portfolio balance channel
cannot adequately explain how intervention influences exchange rates,
without providing a microeconomic mechanism for changing market ex-
pectations. We cannot be therefore surprised that Heikensten and Borg
(2002) devote in their comprehensive article about intervention just two
sentences to the portfolio balance channel, beginning with “historically” and
ending with “of little importance”.
3.2.4 The Signaling (Expectations) Channel
Through the signaling channel, the intervention (whether sterilized or
not) can affect exchange rates via providing new relevant information – or
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15 The demand for domestic money remains by assumption unchanged. Even if the depre-
ciation increases demand for foreign assets B* (measured in domestic currency) through
a rise in W, it reduces also the final demand B*D (measured in foreign currency) through
the term
1
in equation (3). The resulting effect is negative by assumptions not ––
S
noted here – see (Branson – Henderson, 1985, p. 757, fn. 9). Lyons (2001, p. 300, fn. 8) ex-
plains the change in exchange rate in another way, via the expected depreciation term in
equations (2) and (3).information already known but not fully used by market traders in the de-
termination of exchange rates – to the market, thus influencing exchange
rate expectations. This channel assumes that monetary authorities have
better information to market participants and that they are willing to re-
veal it to the public (Sarno – Taylor, 2001), (Dominguez – Frankel, 1993a).
There are two ways for a central bank to change market expectations by
intervention: first, the central bank may signal to the market agents that
they are using available information and interpreting the current and ex-
pected evolution of relevant fundamentals in the wrong way, which leads
to a misalignment in exchange rate determination. If, for example, the cen-
tral bank believes that the exchange rate has appreciated more than eco-
nomic fundamentals justify, it will buy foreign currency, signaling with it
that the exchange rate level should be lower. If market participants believe
that the central bank is right, they will correct their expectations and lower
the exchange rate by trading with the new information. However, there are
two questions about this method. First, why should the central bank have
better information about fundamentals to the market participants ((a dis-
cussion of this argument can be found for example in (Humpage – Oster-
berg, 2000)), and second, even if it has, why should the market agents be-
lieve that the central bank is right?
The second way in which intervention can influence expectations partly
responds to these two questions. First, monetary authorities may not have
superior information to the public in all fundamental issues that contribute
to the exchange rate determination. However, they have surely superior in-
formation in the field of future monetary policy. Thus, foreign exchange in-
tervention may signal changes in future monetary policy. Second, inter-
vention provides very credible information about future monetary policy
because the monetary authorities stake their capital in support of that po-
licy, as stated for the first time by Mussa (1981). In this sense, the mere 
announcement of future monetary policy or other verbal interventions in
order to affect exchange rate expectations do not represent credible state-
ments. If, for example, a central bank wants to depreciate the domestic cur-
rency, it will buy foreign bonds, signaling with it future monetary ease, i.e.
fall in interest rates. Because such an intervention as a signal of future
monetary policy is credible – the central bank would otherwise suffer losses
if it failed to validate its signals – the market traders will change their ex-
pectations of future interest rates. In the portfolio balance framework, for
example, the private investors will thus expect depreciation of domestic cur-
rency, which lowers the demand for domestic bonds and raises the demand
for foreign bonds according to the equations (2) and (3), leading to current
depreciation.
The second, more persuasive method is currently discussed in the litera-
ture as a possible way of influencing the exchange rate via affecting mar-
ket expectations (Heikensten – Borg, 2002). However, there are still some
relevant questions. First, if the intervention must be accommodated by sub-
sequent changes in monetary policy, it is no more an independent policy in-
strument. Second, within the inflation targeting regime, central banks gain
credibility by sound monetary practices, transparency and inflation fore-
casts aimed to influence market expectations. Why should such a central
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to announce changes in future monetary policy? Svensson (2001, p. 48) thus
argues, “[interventions] may have more substantial effects only when they
are interpreted as signals or threats of future interest rate changes. Atrans-
parent central bank has better ways of sending such signals, though [...] 
I see no reason why a transparent inflation-targeter should undertake fo-
reign exchange interventions.” Third, discussed in the literature under
theterm “secrecy puzzle” (Edison, 1993), (Sarno – Taylor, 2001), (Dominguez
– Frankel, 1993a), if monetary authorities want to signal future monetary
policy by intervention, why do they often maintain secrecy of intervention
operations?
3.2.5 The Microstructure (Order Flow) Channel
Even if the signaling channel explains more than the portfolio balance
channel, there are some questions, take secrecy puzzle for example, left for
further research. In recent literature, the research interest moves to the mi-
crostructure approach to foreign exchange market (D’Souza, 2002), (Lyons,
1997, 2001), (Peiers, 1997), (Frankel et al., 1996). The microstructure chan-
nel is very similar to the market channel because it focuses on the func-
tioning of foreign exchange markets. Private information, institutions (trad-
ing mechanisms) and different motives of players in themarket are relevant
features that can affect market prices (i.e. exchange rates) but cannot be at
the same time explained in the traditional macroeconomic framework of ex-
change rate determination.
In this channel, order flow, i.e. transaction volume that is signed accord-
ing to the initiation of transaction (minus for active selling, plus for active
purchasing) plays the central role. If an investor sells EUR 200 million for
dollars in the foreign exchange markets at the best bid price, then the trans-
action volume is EUR 200 million, but order flow is – EUR 200 million.
Thus, over time, we can measure order flow as the sum of the signed buyer-
-initiated and seller-initiated orders. If order flow approaches zero, there is
a balance between buyer-initiated and seller-initiated transactions, as op-
posed to, for example, the financial crisis where the central bank is usually
the only buyer of domestic currency (i.e. order flow is significantly nega-
tive). Order flow thus carries relevant information about market pressures,
fundamentals or market expectations that are often not public. There is
asymmetric information; some agents (typically large players) in the mar-
ket are better informed than others are because they observe more order
flow.
The channel works as follows (Peiers, 1997): the central bank intervenes
rather secretly and without an official announcement in the foreign ex-
change market through some commercial bank. Such a bank, by receiving
a market order from the central bank, gains information advantage, and
a short-term profit opportunity. Thus, it adjusts its order flows and prices.
Other banks in the market learn from the order flows that there is an in-
formed agent in the market (i.e. a trader that knows relevant information
regarding fundamental determinants of exchange rate) and, in order to mi-
nimize losses, will adjust their positions accordingly. However, after all com-
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given the first impulse, they will return to their pre-intervention trading
strategies.
This channel implies that, under the assumption of asymmetric infor-
mation between informed and uninformed traders and when intervening
“secretly” (at least to some extent), the central bank does not have to buy
or sell large volumes of currency as in the simple market channel if it aims
to influence the spot exchange rate. At the same time, the effect of inter-
vention is not as short lasting as in the market channel. On the other hand,
even if the secret intervention strategy, aiming to maintain the traders in
some kind of uncertainty about fundamentals, can temporarily weaken
the exchange rate misalignment, it is still a kind of “fooling” the market
and provides no durable solution to the very problem of market expecta-
tions. Thus, again, this channel may serve only to signal the “right” value
of exchange rate to the market participants.
3.2.6 The Noise Trading Channel
The question that remains after discussing all the relevant channels is
whether intervention could really have longer-lasting effects. Hung (1997)
suggested a new transmission channel – again based on the functioning and
microstructure of the foreign exchange market – through which the central
bank can influence not only the immediate exchange rate, but as well
the market expectations about the future exchange rate trend.
The basic logic starts with the assumption that there are “noise traders”
in the foreign exchange market, i.e. traders whose behavior is influenced
by beliefs or market sentiments not fully consistent with economic funda-
mentals. Noise traders are chartists who usually follow past trends, rely-
ing on some kind of feedback rule, use technical analysis to generate buy-
ing or selling signals, and often trade in a correlated fashion. If most of
the traders in the foreign exchange market are noise traders, the probabi-
lity of speculative bubbles and long-term misalignment rises.
If the central bank intervenes secretly in a thin market where chartists
operate, the immediate transitory and short-lasting effect may induce
the noise traders to perceive that the prevailing trend has broken and to in-
corporate this new information into their trend analysis. Because chartists
usually assign much heavier weight to the most recent exchange rate move-
ment in their forecasts, they may take the effect of intervention as a warn-
ing signal of a change in the market direction and even reverse their be-
havior, for example from buying the currency to selling it.
This kind of intervention, by enhancing the exchange rate volatility and
thus promoting asense of two-way risk in themarket, seems to be at thefirst
sight a contradiction of one of the main motive for intervention, i.e. to lower
the exchange rate volatility. However, only in this way can the traders be
maintained, in theuncertainty about thefuture exchange rate development.
In addition, this channel offers a satisfactory explanation why monetary
authorities often intervene in a thin market, why they intervene secretly
and why they hope (and sometimes manage) to reach a longer-lasting ef-
fect on the exchange rate.
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Sarno and Taylor (2001) present a new channel, not yet discussed in the li-
terature, based on coordination failure of foreign exchange market. If there
is an irrational speculative bubble brought about, for example, by techni-
cal trading rules, it may be very hard for individual traders to bring about
a reversion of the exchange rate, even if they believe it to be misaligned,
due to a coordination failure. If, for example, the Czech koruna was over-
valued and all traders knew this, they would still prefer not to sell it be-
cause no one wants to be the first to burst the bubble.
This intervention can be seen as fulfilling a coordinating role because
it brings other traders into the market and can turn the trend. However,
because of its novelty, this channel has not yet been discussed theoreti-
cally and there is as well no persuasive empirical evidence of its func-
tioning.
4. Is Foreign Exchange Intervention Efficient? Empirical
Evidence
Alarge amount of literature is devoted to the problem whether (sterilized)
foreign exchange intervention, working through any of the described chan-
nels, was in reality efficient, i.e. whether monetary authorities actually
reached the intended aim through this instrument. The empirical evidence
is mixed; in the 1980s, most of the studies largely rejected the effectiveness
of intervention. In the 1990s, a number of studies have shown that inter-
vention could be, under some circumstances, efficient. As Sarno and Taylor
(2001) argue, however, the studies from the 1980s lack availability of rele-
vant data on intervention (change in foreign exchange reserves was usu-
ally used as proxy) and expectations (rational expectations were assumed
but not tested). Thus, we should take the new studies more seriously than
the older ones.
The first of the empirical studies on intervention, the famous Jurgensen
Report (Jurgensen, 1983), prepared by anintergovernmental working group
of G-7, did not provide very explicit conclusions about the efficiency of in-
tervention. The main results can be summarized as follows: sterilized in-
tervention affects long-run exchange rates much less than nonsterilized in-
tervention; sterilized intervention can influence exchange rates only in
the short run; coordinated intervention (i.e. concerted intervention of more
than one central bank) can be much more powerful, relative to official in-
tervention by a single country’s authorities. Thus, being unable to affect
long-run exchange rates, the intervention was regarded by most authori-
ties as inefficient, the U.S. Treasury in 1981–1985 being the best example.16
Even if the U.S. dollar significantly appreciated in this period as a result
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16 From the beginning of the floating in 1973 to 1981, the U.S. Treasury, responsible for foreign
exchange intervention, intervened together with the Federal Reserve System – through the Fe-
deral Reserve Bank of New York – quite heavily against depreciation in late 1970s, however
with ambiguous results, providing a strong argument against intervention (Dominguez –
Frankel, 1993a).of the Paul Volcker’s disinflation program, the monetary authorities re-
frained from intervention.
Another famous study, written by Edison (1993), surveys most of the lite-
rature between 1982 and 1992. Regarding the portfolio balance channel,
the surveyed studies find no or very weak (Gosh, 1992) portfolio balance ef-
fect on the exchange rate. The signaling channel is more promising, show-
ing some significant empirical relations between official intervention and
future monetary policy. Dominguez and Frankel (1993a, 1993b) show that
there are statistically significant effects of both portfolio balance and sig-
naling channels, using official data on intervention and modeling the ex-
change rate expectations via market forecasts. Especially coordinated in-
tervention has been successful at moving the exchange rate in the desired
direction, the best evidence being the coordinated intervention aimed to
burst the appreciation bubble of the dollar in 1985 (as embodied in the so-
-called Plaza Agreement, settled in September 1985 at the G-5 meeting in
theNew York’s Plaza Hotel). On theother hand, Kaminsky and Lewis (1996)
find in their empirical study that the U.S. interventions, in some periods of
1980s, signaled future monetary policy in an opposite direction than pre-
dicted by the signaling channel.17
Thus, as well as the theoretical debate about intervention channels,
the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of foreign exchange interven-
tion remains ambiguous. Some concerted, large interventions actually af-
fected exchange rates for more than hours, but if they were not in corre-
spondence with underlying fundamentals and monetary policy, they had
only a short-term impact. With some exceptions (Hung, 1997), (Peiers, 1997),
the microstructure and the noise trading channel have not been empirically
estimated, so that one has to rely on some stylized facts, which however
support so far the relevance of both micro-transmission channels when es-
timating the effectiveness of intervention.
5. Conclusion: The Czech Koruna Episode Reinterpreted
In the light of the theoretical debate and empirical evidence, how are we
now to interpret the Czech experience including the use of official inter-
vention? In this respect, there are at least two questions to answer.
Firstly, as already noted, the question is whether a central bank under
inflation targeting should use foreign exchange intervention at all. So far,
there is no clear answer to this question, given either by theory or by in-
ternational experience. The theoretical positions reached from the negative
one made by Svensson (2001) about redundancy of this instrument as a sig-
nal up to the positive one made for example by Wadhwani (2000) about pre-
venting the hysteresis effect. The international experience gives no clear
answers as well. The praxis of the inflation targeting central banks reaches
from the “no intervention” strategy of the inflation-targeting pioneer New
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17 For further discussion of empirical evidence and for surveys of the relevant literatu-
re see (Edison, 1993), (Dominguez – Frankel, 1993a), (Baillie et al., 1999) or (Sarno – Tay-
lor, 2001).Zealand (has not intervened since 1985) to the more pragmatic approach
taken by central banks of Australia or Sweden – see (Heikensten – Borg,
2002) – that occasionally intervene.18 However, the use of foreign exchange
intervention is always somehow justified and regarded as exceptional (for
example if the interest rate instrument does not work efficiently). As already
noted, specific causes of the excessive koruna appreciation, regarded as mis-
alignment, together with the risks, which such an appreciation may repre-
sent for the very open Czech economy, may justify the use of intervention.
Second, the question remains if the interventions conducted by the Czech
National Bank have been effective and, if so, through which channels did
they work. I have already argued that the role of official intervention – espe-
cially those in the second phase, leaving those in the first phase as ineffi-
cient at all – in the fight against the appreciation is not clear. Following, 
I list some arguments supporting the view that the interventions might
have contributed to the reversion of the exchange rate path.
First, being performed secretly via foreign banks, the intervention might
have affected the overall market expectations about further appreciation
and the market sentiment. In this respect, the intervention could have
worked through both the order flow channel and the noise trading channel.
Through order flow, the traders might have gained the information that
some other traders (foreign banks) are reversing their expectations, selling
rather than buying the Czech koruna and going out of the “bubble game”.
Because of rising uncertainty about privatization revenues, or more pre-
cisely because of rising certainty that the revenues would not go through
the market, the bubble was already at the point of bursting, i.e. the proba-
bility of depreciation was considerably high and the share of traders ex-
pecting it was significantly increasing. Similarly, through the noise trading
channel secret interventions might have increased the volatility and in-
duced the chartists to change their strategies and to incorporate the higher
probability of depreciation into their trend analyses, leading to the factual
depreciation.
The second argument for the role of intervention considers the lack of
other impulses or information that could have caused the sudden reversion.
In July 2002, all the information regarding fundamentals, monetary policy
or government intentions were already present. No new relevant informa-
tion about economy arrived, the market expected further declines in inte-
rest rates, and government confirmed the will to adhere to the agreed-on
Strategy, as had been shown by the sale of euros from the Transgas priva-
tization direct into the foreign exchange reserves of the central bank. Thus,
the only “cause” that suddenly changed the market sentiment must have
been the secret interventions.
I agree with Holub (2003) that the effectiveness of the interventions con-
ducted in July–September 2002 was supported by other factors: (a) a chang-
ing market sentiment, caused by the expected cancellation of some large
privatizations and the adherence of the government to the Strategy, (b) ne-
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http://www.riksbank.se/  and Australia http://www.rba.gov.au/ for their position regarding
the use of official intervention.gative interest rate differential between the koruna-denominated and
the euro-denominated assets (since the end of July 2002), making the ko-
runa less attractive for investors, and (c) change in the market’s perception
of the sterilization costs.
The negative interest rate differential not only made the foreign exchange
intervention – if preventing the koruna from further appreciation – even
profitable, but also contributed to the change of behavior of the main mar-
ket makers – commercial banks. In the first phase of interventions in Oc-
tober 2001–April 2002, the commercial banks had to absorb most of the fo-
reign currency in the market, facing a risk of losing money with lower
interest rates on the euro than on the koruna. As a result, together with
the expectations of continuing koruna appreciation, they offered less and
less for the euro, making the koruna factually strong. In this situation,
the banks used the interventions only as a welcome opportunity to get rid
of the foreign currency, without any stronger effects on the offered exchange
rate. However, with falling domestic interest rates and changing market
sentiment in July–September 2002 from appreciation to possible deprecia-
tion, foreign assets became more profitable, contributing to the reversion of
the trend. In this case, the banks reacted to the interventions more sensi-
tively than in the first phase.19
From the point of view just described, one has to ask whether these “com-
plement” factors would not have sufficed for the reversion of the exchange
rate trend and whether the interventions had been necessary. This issue
must be seen in a larger perspective of the traditional empirical debate on
exchange rate determination. We are rarely possible to identify ex post
the definitive fundamental cause of the exchange rate development. How-
ever, if fundamental variables create space for the reversion of the exchange
rate trend, then interventions may play a decisive role.20 I argue that in-
terventions at the right time and under favorable fundamental conditions,
as mentioned above, can have a multiple effect through the described mi-
crostructure channels on the market expectations and hence on the ex-
change rate. This thesis is in accordance with the conclusion of Dominguez
and Frankel (1993a, p. 140) as well: “It may be that sterilized intervention
can only have effects in the short term. But if “short-term effects” include
the bursting of a nine-month bubble earlier than it would otherwise have
burst, then such an effect may be all that is needed.”
One may ask if the intervention worked also through the signaling chan-
nel, as the channel that has some empirical relevance and sound logic. Well,
I argue that even if one can interpret the intervention as a signal of further
decline in interest rates, the signal was redundant. Within the inflation-
-targeting framework, as mentioned above, the Czech National Bank has
already sent a clear message of its intentions regarding interest rates
through the published Bank Board minutes, everyday communication with
media, and Inflation Reports. In this regard, the Czech experience also chal-
lenges the traditional theoretical approach to the effectiveness of interven-
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20 I owe this comment to Oliver Landmann.tions, diminishing therelevance of themacroeconomic portfolio-balance and
signaling channels, and providing more support for themicrostructure chan-
nels.
We may conclude that intervention is and remains an important instru-
ment of central banks, as a renewed interest in recent literature shows
(Canales-Kriljenko et al., 2003). However, its use should be limited only to
those rare situations where standard instruments (i.e. interest rates) do not
work any more. When considering foreign exchange intervention, the cen-
tral bank should moreover wait for the right moment in order to maximize
the effect on the expectations and the exchange rate, and take into consi-
deration specific circumstances, market sentiment and external factors, con-
tributing to the exchange rate determination. From this point of view, those
of the Czech National Bank’s interventions that were conducted in
July–September 2002 can be assessed as quite efficient and relatively suc-
cessful.
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SUMMARY
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Foreign Exchange Intervention: The Theoretical
Debate and the Czech Koruna Episode
Adam GERŠL – PhD student at the Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute 
of Economic Studies and adviser to the Vice-Governor of the Czech National Bank
(gersl@mbox.fsv.cuni.cz)
The strong appreciation of the Czech koruna over 2001–2002 and the foreign ex-
change interventions conducted by the Czech central bank under its inflation-tar-
geting regime provide a good opportunity to consider the pros and cons of FX 
intervention, an often-controversial monetary-policy instrument. This article con-
siders the koruna’s said appreciation, possible causation, and the policy measures
taken by the central bank then to counter the appreciation. The theoretical chan-
nels through which foreign exchange intervention may influence the exchange rate,
and empirical evidence of their effectiveness are presented. Finally, the FX inter-
ventions of the Czech National Bank are discussed and those conducted in a rather
secret manner over July–September 2002 assessed as relatively effective.
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